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The objective of this study is to examine the economic factors motivating 
Australian listed lessee firms to adopt capitalization of  finance leases policy 
from 1985 to 1987 as permitted by the transitional provision of  AAS 17. 
Capitalization is considered as the preferred accounting policy for finance 
leases compared to footnote disclosure. Adopting a joint efficient 
contracting and quality signaling perspective, support for the research 
hypotheses would be construed as suggesting that capitalization is a means 
for lessee firms to reduce or mitigate agency and/or political costs and 
concurrently as a signal to the market that they are better quality firms. The 
sample consists of 314 lessee firms; 67 firms as capitalizes and 247 firms 
as non-capitalizers. A pooled multivariate cross-sectional analysis for 1985 
to 1987 was performed incorporating sensitivity analysis to determine the 
“best” logistic regression model. This model was then assessed to determine 
its validity and predictive efficacy, the results provide evidence that lessee 
firms adopted the capitalization as response to the media attention as being 
politically visible firms and concurrently as a signal to the market that they 
are better quality firms. The evidence also suggests limited usefulness of a 
lengthy transitional period.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The measurement  and disclosure ways of  f inance leases were vexing and 
contentious issues in Australia, as reflected in the discussions it generated and the 
t ime it took to develop an accounting standard (Roberts,  1980; Whittred and Zimmer ,  
1992). This study examines the economic factors motivating Austral ian listed lessee
1 This paper is based on an earlier version of a paper presented at the 8th Asian-Pacific 
Conference on international Accounting Issues held at Vancouver, Canada from the 13th to 
16th October 1996.
V o l .  6. N o .  2 D e c  1998
"?) Centre lor Indones ian  A c c o u n t in g  and M a n a g e m e n t  R esearch
2  L ea s e  A c c o u n t in g  in Australia: Further
companies  to adopt capitalization or footnote disclosure o f  their f inance lease2 
commitments  during the period 1985 to 1987. as permitted by the transitional 
provision o f  accounting standard AAS 17: Accounting for Leases (Australian 
Account ing Research Foundation [AARF],  Account ing Standards Board [ASB]. 
1984).
This study makes a contribution in two aspects, f irst, this study proposes 
that a joint  contracting-signaling theory o f  the economic consequences  paradigm will 
better explain the phenomenon than a separate contracting theory or signaling theor\ 
analyses.  Second, the findings o f  this study will also provide a further view on the 
usefulness o f  a lengthy transitional provision in an accounting standard. Whilst  there 
is a cost/benefi t  argument  supporting such provision (Langer and Lev. 1993). there is 
also a claim that a transitional provision provides firms with opportunity to indirectly 
manipulate their income (Pincus and Wasley, 1994).
The remainder  o f  this paper is organized as follows. The next section 
provides an overview o f  the main issues related to capitalization o f  finance leases, 
and continues with the literature review and the research hypotheses.  The last three 
sections contain the research method,  the discussion o f  the results, and the summary 
and conclusion to the paper, including alternative plausible hypotheses,  and some 
suggestions for future research.
C ap i t a l i za t i o n  o f  F in a n c e  Lease
The AAS 17 permitted lessees, during the transitional period, to adopt  a 
policy o f  capital izing all finance leases or to adopt a policy of  treating all minimum 
lease payments as periodic expenses (para. 60). However,  further disclosures were 
required in respect o f  non-capitalized finance leases so as to provide sufficient 
information to permit  financial statement users to appreciate the effect on the balance 
sheet if f inance leases had been capitalized.
With regard to the financial statements effects, the literature reveals that 
capitalization affects lessees Balance Sheet and Income Statement in terms o f  higher 
gearing and negative effect on reported income respectively, at least in the year of
: Originally, AAS 17 defined a finance lease as “a lease which effectively transfers from the 
lessor to the lessee substantially all the risks and benefits incident to the ownership of 
the leased property” (para 5 ). However, the revised AAS 17 and also ASRB 1008 
(AARF, ASB, and Accounting Standards Review Board [ASRB], 1987) defines a 
finance lease as any lease which is not an operating lease. Thus, a finance lease is a 
lease that effectively (in the economic rather than legal sense) represents the 
purchase of an asset.
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adoption (Abdel-khalik.  I 981: Ashton. 1985; FIGazaar.  Lilien and Pastena. 1986; 
FIGazaar and Jaggi. 199“'; Whitt led and Zimmer,  1992).
Although the e\ idenee from the literature suggests that either policy brings 
the same information into the market, we believe capita I i/at ion is the preferred 
policy compared to footnote c i t l o ^ n r e .  This is because: ( I ) Capital izat ion reflects 
the true economic substance of  lessee firms' resources and obligations.  The literature 
indicates that leases and debts are substitutes in f irm's  capital structure (Marston and 
Harris. 1983). and that users are more likely to consider recognized obligations [due 
to capitalization] as debt than disclosed obligations as debt (Gopalakr ishnan and 
Parkash. 1996). (2) Capitalization has economic consequences  because it affects 
users'  economic decision making process which used the account ing numbers that 
are altered by capitalization (Brown. 1994; I lolthausen and Feftwich.  1983).
L i t e r a t u r e  Review
Senteney and Strawser (1990) attempted to de te rmine  whether 
ma nageme nt ' s  decision to adopt  SFAS 87 Pension Account ing dur ing the two-vears 
transitional period was influenced by financial statements e ffect s .5 They tested the 
f irm's leverage and size as possible explanatory factors. Senteney and Strawser 
(1990) inferred from their evidence that the t iming o f  m anageme nt ' s  adoption o f  
SFAS 87 might  be influenced by its financial statements effects 4.
Sami and Welsh (1992) extended the earlier study by Senteney and St rawser
(1990) by incorporating a number  o f  improvements in certain areas' ,  including 
deve loping testable hypotheses based on the agency and political costs theoretical
; Benjamin, Grossman and Wiggins (1986) had earlier examined the financial impact of the 
adoption of SFAS 52 Foreign Currency Translation during the transitional period. How ever, 
this study lacks relevance due to its approach which is descriptive rather than a positive 
accounting theory study.
1 This was an inconclusive inference because only one of three financial statements variables 
tested in their study was significant. However, they offered no suggestions as to what could be 
the possible underlying motive for management to adopt SFAS 87 during the transitional 
period. This query remains further unanswered because both of the other firm specific 
characteristics, i.e.. firm size and leverage, were not statistically significant. Moreover, 
contrary to the political cost hypothesis; size was found to be positively associated with 
adoption of SFAS 87 - an income increasing accounting policy.
" A major difference between these studies is their objective. While Senteney and Strawser 
(1990) hypothesised that the financial statement effects of SFAS 87 influenced management's 
decision to adopt/not, adopt, Sami and Welsh (1992) hypothesised that the decision was 
influenced by managers' economic incentives.
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framework.  They investigated whether  m anageme nt ’s voluntary choice to adopt  the 
provisions o f  SFAS 87 in the first two of  the three years transitional period was 
associated with factors influencing manager 's  economic incentives. They inferred 
that early adopters were more frequently subjected to account ing-based debt 
constraints;  related to firm size, funding status, and ow nership control.
Wilkins and Mok (1991) analysed lessee f irms’ discret ionary finance leases 
account ing policy choice (i.e., either capitalization or footnote disclosure) during the 
first year  (1985)  o f  the transitional period for AAS 17. In summary,  they found that 
(1) leverage, interest coverage,  increase jn  profits, and increase in interest coverage 
influence m a nag em ent ’s choice o f  finance lease disclosure,  and (2) profits, increase 
in leverage, size industry, and audit  firm do not appear to influence the account ing 
policy choice.  They concluded that ‘‘managers make  capitalization decisions aimed 
at maximiz ing  near term profits and minimiz ing accounting measure o f  financial 
risk’’ (p. 1 77).
The preceding studies have limitations which we sought to remedy in this 
study. The lack o f  sound theoretical f ramework that would explain f i rm’s accounting 
policy choices is evident  in Senteney and Strawser 1990) and Wilkins and Mok
(1991).  The preceding three studies also suffer from the limitation o f  incomplete 
samples.  That  is, these studies had neglected to analyse f i rms’ accounting policy 
choice throughout  the transitional period o f  the relevant account ing pronouncements.
R e s e a r c h  H y po th ese s
Modern corporations are characterized by the separation o f  ownership and 
control /management  (Kama and Jensen, 1983). This characteristic leads to two 
related issues; conflict  o f  interest and information asymmetry between the owners,  
managers  and debtholders.  Evidence from the literature suggests that these issues are 
resolved by the managers  o f  the firms through adopting a combinat ion of. efficient 
contracting'1 and quality signaling. In the context  o f  this study, it is hypothesised that 
the efficient contracting and quality signaling by way o f  the lessee firms'  decisions 
to adopt capitalization rather than footnote disclosure o f  finance leases. This is 
because the former  possesses favourable features compared to the latter policy. As
*’ We believe the other two alternative perspectives of contracting; opportunistic behaviour and 
information perspectives (Molthausen, 1990) are not relevant in the context of  this study 
because (1) Capitalization of finance leases is not an income increasing policy in the year of 
adoption (Abdel-khalik, 1981; El-Gazaar ct al., 1986; Rl-Gazaar and Jaggi, 1997; Whittled 
and Zimmer, 1992); and (2) Capitalization does not affect lessee firms' cash flows and thus, it 
is not an accounting policy that provides additional information about managers' expectation 
of  firms’ future cash flows.
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stated earlier, capitalization would (1) reduce expected oppor tunism through its 
negative financial statement effects, and (2) reduce opportunity loss due to adverse 
selection via facilitating decision making since true economic substance is revealed 
and also less flexibi 1 it\ in reporting finance lease commitment  [thus, mit igating 
creative accounting] (Christie and Z im me rm an .  1994).
Hence, the general premise of  the research hypotheses is: The objective of  
the f irms'  decisions to capitalize finance leases is to mitigate the agency/poli t ical  
costs incurred by these firms, and to signal as being better quality firms to the 
financial statements users7. This accounting policy choice has the implication o f  
maximizing  the value of  the firm (Holthausen.  1990). The relevant variables and 
their operational definitions, as empirical proxies, are presented in Table 1.
T ab le  1 H e r e
Corporate control structure
the degree o f  separation between management  / control and ownersh ip is not 
uniform across firms. The degree is greater for management -cont ro lled firms 
(hereafter called MC firms) than it is for owner-controlled firms (hereafter called OC 
firms); resulting in MC firms experiencing greater agency costs and information 
asymmetry  than OC firms. In this situation, rational outside shareholders would 
resort to price protection8 and other mechanisms that aim to reduce the costs o f  
expected opportunism by managers.  In view o f  the situation, managers  o f  MC firms 
have greater incentives to choose appropriate accounting policy to mitigate the 
agency costs and opportunity loss resulting from information asymmetry,  since 
capitalization o f  finance lease is the preferred accounting policy compared to 
footnote disclosure,  hypothesis HI is formulated as follows.
H I :  M anagement-controlled (MC) firm s are more likely to capitalize 
finance leases than owner-controlled (OC) firms.
7 The research hypotheses are formulated in the uni-directional form because of  the generally 
expected effect of finance lease capitalization in the year of adoption on lessees’ balance sheet 
(i.e. higher gearing) and income statement (i.e. shifts to defers income to later years). (Ashton, 
1985; Blake, Sales and Clarke, 1995; El-Gazaar et al., 1986; El-Gazaar and Jaggi, 1997; 
Whittred and Zimmer, 1992).
s Price protect refers to the action where “the outside debt-and share-holders discount the price 
they are willing to pay for their claims for any expected managerial actions that reduce their 
future returns” (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994 p. 541).
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Debt contracting
Conflict  o f  interest and information asymmetry also exist in the relationship 
between outside debtholders and managers (as agents to the owners)  o f  firms. In 
order to prevent wealth transfers awav from debtholders to equityholders.  the former 
would price protect themselv es and implement a mechanism o f  restrictive covenants 
which are present in most debt issues, private and public. These types of reactions 
suggest a positive relationship between leverage and agency costs o f  debt (Watts and 
Zimmerman.  1986). Since the provisions contained in these covenants such as 
leverage and interest coverage are usuallv defined with reference to generally 
accepted account ing principles, a lessee could be in technical default if it capitalized 
its f inance leases rather than disclosed them in the footnotes of their financial 
statements.  This is because lease capitalizations is likely to increase leverage ratios 
(Abdel-khalik.  1981; Ashton, 1985; El-Gazaar et ah.  1986; ElCJazaar and Jaggi. 
1997; Whittred and Zimmer,  1992). Thus, the incentive for the decision to opt for 
capitalization o f  finance leases is not constant across lessees.
Firms can be grouped into high and low-leveraged firms. In this study, it is 
proposed that the letter stand to gain more from capitalization o f  finance leases. This 
is because apart from the benefits [as mentioned earlier] o f  capitalization, low 
leveraged lessee firms have greater capacity to increase debt  to the extent that they 
are further away from the need to renegotiate their debt covenants brought about by 
the increase in debt through capitalization of- f inance leases, thus, the debt 
contracting hypothesis is formulated as fol lows.1’
H2: Low leveraged firms are more likely to capitalize finance leases than 
high leveraged firms.
Firm size /  information production cost
Evidence from the literature suggests that if information production costs 
related to certain accounting policy are high, then large firms are more likely to have 
the resources necessary to adopt such accounting policy (Ball and Foster, 1982; 
Firth. 1979). In the case o f  finance lease capitalization, it is considered that the
An ideal research design to test this hypothesises to measure the spread between each firm's 
maximum contractual leverage ratio and its prevailing leverage ratio. However, this 
information is not readily available. Nevertheless, evidence from Duke and Hunt (1990), and 
Press and Weintrop (1990) indicate that leverage ratios are correlated with closeness to actual 
debt covenant constraints, and therefore are good proxies for tightness of debt covenant 
constraints.
Vol.  6. N o .  2 D e c  1998
(C Centre for Indones ian  A ccou n tin ' :  and M a n a g e m e n t  Research
I h e  International Journal o f  A c c o u n t in g  and B u s in e s s  S o c ie ty
information production costs are non-trivial. These costs include the following: (1) 
Certain costs are incurred to assess the impact o f  capitalization on lessees financial 
statements,  i.e.. higher gearing and negative effect on income statement:  (2) Addition 
bookkeeping costs associated with a new reporting system that differs from tax 
requi rements (Whittred and / i m m e r .  1992): and (3) Costs o f  t raining and education 
to enable preparers of  financial statements to be familiar and competent  with the 
capitalization requirement and related concepts,  for example,  implicit interest rates, 
present value o f  future obligations, and fair values (Harris.  1983 ).
In view o f  the positive relationship between information production costs 
relating to capitalization and firm size, it is apparent that large lessee firms have 
greater motivation to capitalize their finance leases. This motivation is further 
supported by the potential gains offered by capitalization policy. Thus, hypothesis 
113 is formulated as follows.
H3 Larger firms arc more likely to capitalize finance teases than smaller 
firms.
Political visibility
Political visibility refers to the situation whereby a firm attracts a 
disproport ionate share o f  scrutiny by the government  and its regulatory agencies or 
other interest groups (including the general public and trade unions),  Making  it a 
potential target for tighter regulation which imposes extra costs on the firm. 
Financial statements are a source o f  information used by interested parties in singling 
out firms for w ealth transfers through dev ices such as imposition o f  taxes, removal o f  
subsidies and licenses, and restriction o f  firm's activities. However,  the extent to 
which these devices rely on accounting based data varies widely.  Thus  it is 
hypothesised politically visible firms are more inclined to adopt appropriate 
accounting policy that will reduce the political costs.
It is proposed that since capitalization o f  finance leases is an account ing 
policy that minimises expected opportunism and opportunity loss, it is also policy 
that will help firms from being subjected to further imposition o f  political costs. In 
this context,  large lessee firms stand to gain more from adopting capitalization that 
small lessee firms. Thus, it is hypothesised that:
H4:  Firms with higher political visibility are more likely to capitalize 
f  inance leases than firms with lower political visibility.
The level o f  press coverage is used to measure firms'  political visibility. This 
is considered to be an appropriate proxy because o f  "an expectat ion that firms that 
are constantly in the media spotlight are more susceptible to political [wealth]
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transfers that firms that rarelv receive media attention" (Deegan and Caroll.  1993 p. 
223). Thus, the le\el  o f  press coverage (a component  o f  the media) encapsulates "the 
media ' s  perception of  the aggregate political \ i sibi l i ty of  firm arising from one or a 
combinat ion o f  specific sources" (Panchapakesan and McKinnon.  1992 p. 75). 
fmpi r ical  evidence supports the contention of  a strong link between the level o f  
press coverage and political visibility (Panchapakesan and McKinnon.  1992).
Financial performance
It is proposed in this study that ev en in the absence o f  explicit income-based 
bonus plans, management  may have an incentive to mitigate decreases in the level o f  
reported income (Christie and Zimmerman.  1994; Sami and Welsh. 1992; Trombley.  
1989). The primary reason for this is that poor performance relative to the preceding 
year may lead to termination, whereas improved performance can just ify requests for 
increased compensat ion.  Since capitalization o f  finance leases adversely affects the 
lessees'  financial statements,  ceteris paribus, the incentive to adopt the capitalization 
method is not uniform across lessee firms.
Thus it is hypothesised that firms with greater improved financial 
per formance relative to the preceding year have greater incentive to capitalize leases 
than firms with smaller  improved (or no improvement)  financial performance 
relative to the preceding year, this hypothesis is supported by the a rgument  that the 
former  group of  firms have greater capacity to absorb the expected negative effects 
o f  capitalization, and at the same time take advantage o f  the benefits offered by the 
capitalization policy relative to footnote disclosure. Thus, hypothesis H5 is stated as 
follows.
H5:  Firms with bigger percentage growth in pre-adoption income are 
more likely to capitalize finance leases than firm s with smaller 
percentage growth in pre-adoption income.
Overseas association
A lessee is considered to have an overseas association if it is either (1) a 
subsidiary o f  a foreign parent in Canada  or the UK or the USA, or (2) where its 
shares are simultaneously listed in Canada  or the UK or the USA. It is hypothesised 
that firms with either one or both of  these characteristics are more likely to capitalize 
finance leases during the transitional period. The arguments for this hypothesis are as 
follows.
First, Australian subsidiaries o f  foreign parents in Canada,  the UK or the 
USA, where f inance lease capitalization policy is already fully in force, are likely to 
adopt the same practices o f  their parents (Bazley et al., 1985; Gay,  Farley and
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Pcirson. 1993). Since these foreign parents are capitalizing their  finance leases, it is 
hypothesised that their subsidiaries in Australia are more likely to capitalize their 
finance leases. 10 This uniform practice o f  accounting for finance leases would 
facilitate the consolidation of  financial statements by the parents, and at the same 
time al low comparabil i ty of  performance between subsidiaries in Austral ia and in the 
home country.
Second,  Australian lessee firms that are also listed in Canada,  the UK and the 
USA where capitalization o f  finance leases is mandatory have greater  incentive to 
follow suit and capitalize their finance leases. This is because the additional costs to 
account for and to report capitalized finance leases have already been incurred in 
complying with the overseas listing requirements (Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman.  
1981) . In addition, these lessee firms have the necessary experience,  which makes 
them more likely to capitalize finance leases early.
The benefit accruing to firms with an overseas association that adopt the 
capitalization o f  finance leases is in terms o f  the favourable perception by external 
parties, including Australian investors, analysts, and regulators, this would in lower 
agency costs, lower political costs and being perceived as better quali ty firms. Thus 
hypothesis H6 is formulated as follows.
H6:  F 'inns with an overseas association are more likely to capitalize 
finance leases than firms with no overseas association.
R e s e a r c h  M e t h o d
Data sources and sample selection
This study is a cross-sectional study o f  financial report ing practices o f  listed 
lessee firms, finance leases during the transitional period between 1985 and 1987. 
Lessees '  reported in the Australian Graduate School o f  Management  (A G SM ) 
Annual  Reports Microfiche Files (1985. 1986 and 1987) was used as the sample  o f  
this study. " The sampling design o f  this study is as follows. Upon inspection o f  the
It is assumed here that since the finance lease capitalization requirement has become 
mandatory in these countries, these is no reason to believe that lessees in these countries are 
not complying with this requirement.
11 The AGSM File consists of the top 500 listed companies in Australia by market 
capitalisation. The AGSM File that was used in this study is housed at the Edith Cowan 
University. Churchlands’ campus library.
This study acknowledges the limitations of the AGSM File. Deegan and Carroll (1993) note 
that due to the fact that the AGSM File only consists of the top 500 Australian listed 
companies, the results based on this sample may be more specific to larger firms. Further.
V ol.  6. N o .  2 D e c  199X 
©  Centre for Indones ian  A c c o u n t in g  and M a n a g e m e n t  R esearch
10  L ease  A c c o u n t in g  in Australia .  Further
AGSM  File. Australia lessee firms who adopted AAS 17 (either capitalizing or 
disclosing in the footnotes their finance leases transactions) in 1985. 1986 and 1987 
were identified. The sample selection is subjected to the constraint that a lessee firm 
once identified as a capitalizer (footnote discloser) in one year could not be selected 
again as footnote discloser (capitalizer) in the subsequent  year(s).  Subsequently,  
these lessee firms were classified as capitalizer and non-capitalizer (i.e.. footnote 
discloser) across t ime .12 thus, the test or treatment group consists o f  the cap i ta l izes ,  
and the control group is made up of  the non-capitalizers.
Research design
The research design of  this study is pooled cross-sectional analysis for the 
period 1985 to 1987. H A between groups quasi-experimental  design is used to test 
the research hypotheses using a multivariate logistic regression ana lysi s.1" Pre-and 
post-logistic regression diagnostics were performed to assess multicolIinearity 
among  the independent variables,  and to identify influential observations that would
Bazley, Brown and Izan (1985) assert that the AGSM File does not include large private 
companies, and allowance has not been made for the different accounting methods, e.g., 
depreciation/amortisation policies, used by companies in arriving at balance sheet and profit 
and loss figures.
12 This sample selection process is consistent with the approach taken by Whittred and Chan
(1992). but differs slightly with respect to whether the process is with or w ithout replacement 
of subjects. This is because, the sample selection process in this study is non-random.
This sample selection and classification process gives rise to potential self-selection bias 
problems normally encountered in most accounting studies in which firms are not randomly 
assigned to treatment and control groups (Foster. 1980; Abdel-khalik, 1990; Rayburn. 1990). 
One method for correcting self-selection bias is the employment of "two-stage switching 
regression" (Abdel-khalik. 1981; Maddala. 1991; Shehata. 1991). However, due to the 
unavailability of appropriate factors to be incorporated into the regression analyses, this study 
is unable to assess or correct for any such bias.
14 Whittred and Chan (1992) found difficulty in deciding between a time series or a pooled 
cross-sectional analysis methodology for their study. However, in this study a pooled cross­
sectional analysis is considered appropriate because: First, it is conceivable that lessee firms 
that adopted capitalisation ditfer from those that adopted note disclosure policy. Second, it is 
not difficult to define what constitutes an appropriate control group, i.e.. lessee firms that had 
finance lease commitments and chose to disclose such commitments in the notes, rather than 
capitalizing them.
The technique and tool chosen are considered in view of the arguments and findings in the 
literature (Bazley et al., 1985: Maddala. 1991; Scott. 1991. Stone and Rasp. 1991; and 
Tabachnik and Fidelf 1989)
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impact the logistic estimations (Belsley et a L  1980: Fox. 1991: Hair, Anderson.  
Tatham and Black. 1995: l losmer  and Lemeshow.  1989; Maddala,  1991; Stone and 
Rasp. 1991).
The logistic regression model has six independent variables. However,  since 
alternative proxy variables have been developed for OCMC.  S I / E .  and PERF, this 
study employs a sensitivity analysis by testing a total o f  12 logistic regression 
models,  o f  which one will be selected based on its goodness-of-f i t  with all 
independent variables (thereafter referred to as the explanatory power),  significance 
level, and classification accuracy rate. In order to support this selection, the selected 
model is subjected to a split-sample validation process (Hair, et al.. 1995 p. 147).u’
Resul t s
Descriptive statistics and diagnostics
Table 2 reports the composit ion and industry membership o f  the 1985-1987 
sample;  a total o f  3 14 lessee firms classified into the capitalize!' group with 67 lessee 
firms and the non-capitalizer group with 247 lessee f irms .17 A prel iminary analysis o f  
Table 2 shows that the number  o f  resource firms in the capitalize!'  group is relatively 
more than those in the non-capitalizer group. This is also the case for the other 
industries. This suggests that there is a relationship between industry membersh ip  
and the decision to capitalize finance lease commitments .  The statistical evidence 
supports this proposition. The chi-square analysis reveals that there is a significant 
relationship between firms'  industry membership and their f inance lease account ing 
policy choice ( / “ = 12.850: d.f. -  3; p  = 0.005).
T ab le  2 H ere
The descriptive statistics, after data transformation,  o f  the independent 
variables appear in Table 3. Data transformation was necessary because six of ' these 
variables suffer substantial skewness indicating non-normali tv.  Natural logarithmic 
transformation was used on PRESS. SIZE( l ) ,  and SIZE(2) and DEBT'. Square-root  
t ransformation was used on SIZE(3) and PERF( l) .  Table 4 reports the correlation 
analysis among the independent variables. The correlation analysis indicates some
!i' Hair et al.. (1995) state that the objective of the validation process "is to ensure that the 
results are generalizable to the population mid not specific to the sample used in estimation (p. 
147). Demaris (1992, pp. pp. 55-56) suggests a statistic-cross-validation probability of chance 
error (PRECN) -that measures that predictive efficacy in logistic regression. This PRECV 
indicates the level of reduction in prediction errors when the full model is used to predict the 
phenomenon.
1 A list of these firms is av ailable on request from the authors.
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inter-dependence amongst  the independent variables, and thus, lends support  to the 
appropriateness of  multivariate regression analysis, specifically the logistic 
regression (Bazley et al.. 1985: Tabachmk and Udell ,  1989) . js
, Ta b le  3 and  4 H ere
Multivariate results
Results o f  the sensitivity analysis and the assessment o f  the validity and 
efficacy o f  the "best" logistic regression appear in Table 5. An examinat ion o f  the 
result o f  the "best" model shows that the coefficient EnDEBT.  EnPRESS.  and 
OSE AS  are in the hypothesised direction, but only EnPRESS is highly significant at 
p < 0.05. Thus there is strong support for the efficiency/signal perspective hypothesis 
114. that capitalization is positively related to the o f  press coverage as proxy for a 
f i rm's  political visibility. There is no evidence to accept the other live research 
hypotheses.  The coefficients OCMC(2).  LnSIZE(2),  and SqPERF( 1) are not in the 
expected direction. However,  only OCMC (2)  and S q PE RF ( l )  are significant at p  < 
0.05. Fhe implication o f  this finding is that the capitalization decision is more likely 
for lessee firms that had narrowly-held shareholdings: and lessee firms with negative 
change in net income from prior yeaiv"
T ab le  5 H e re
IS Except for the bivariate correlations among the alternative constructs for linn size (to be
used separately in sensitivity analysis), none of the other bivariate correlations reach 0.8. 
Thus, it is inferred that harmful multicollinearity among the independent variables is not 
present. (Farrar and Gaulber. 1967; Lewis-Beck. 1987) .  An examination of the tolerance
levels and VIFS also corroborates this inference (Belsley et al.. 1980: Fox. 1991).
" Sensitivity analysis was performance because for certain variables, there are more than one 
construct to proxy for the variables. Consequently. 12 logistic regression models were 
developed and tested. Only models 7 , 8 . 10,11 and 12, are statistically significant. On an 
overall basis, the "best" model is Model 10 because it has the highest explanatory power 
(model y~ ■= 12.672 ; </. /.  : 6 ), most significant (p - 0 .0485 ) ,  and a comparatively high 
classification accuracy rate of 81 . 53%
Additional multivariate diagnostics were considered necessary to determine the presence of 
any influential observation that could have impacted and biased the model's estimations, the 
studentized residuals, leverage points. DFBETA and Cook's statistics were examined and 
compared with the numerical cutoffs proposed by Hair et al., ( 1995 ) and Fox ( 1991 ) . The
llnding indicates absence of influential observations.
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The validity and efficacy o f  the “ best” model is achieved by per forming the 
spli t-sample validation process and the est imation o f  cross-validat ion probabil i ty 
chance o f  error (PR ECV). Results o f  this process appear in Table 5. On an overall 
comparason,  it appears that the "bes t” model is valid and genaral isable beyond the 
sample.  This is inferred from the result that it has higher explanatory power  and at a 
lower significance level than sub-1 sub-2. And its classification accuracy rate is in 
between that o f  s u b - 1 and sub-2.
In terms o f  the predictive efficacy, est imation o f  PRE C v yields evidence 
suggest ing that the "best1' model is an efficacious model.  When compared with the 
result o f  s u b - 1 and sub-2, the est imated PRECV* is 41.72% and 44.60% respectively,  
thus, it is inferred that the prediction error is reduced by about one ha lf  when using 
the “ best” model to predict whether  a lessee firm will capitalize its f inance lease 
commitments .  In conclusion,  based on the evidence derived from the spli t-sample 
validation process and the estimation of  P R E c \A  Model 10 is a valid, general isable 
and efficacious model.
There is number  o f  factors that could have confounded the preceding results. 
First, the impact  o f  new account ing pronouncements that were introduced dur ing the 
concerned period. Specifically,  these account ing standards limit the options for firms 
to account  for goodwill ,  joint  venture transactions,  foreign subsidiaries financial 
statements,  and research and deve lopment  costs respectively.  As a results,  these 
events influenced f i rms’ account ing policy choices and also their  profitabili ty and 
financial  structures.21
Another  factor that could have confounded the result relates to the 
signif icance o f  finance lease a rrangement for lessee firms that chose to capitalize 
them. We have found that on average,  throughout  1985-1987. capital ized leased 
assets and capital ized lease liabilities only represented about  three percent  o f  
c a p i t a l i z e d  total assets and total liabilities respectively.  This is further supported by 
a finding that in 1988 (the first year  the requirements o f  AAS 1 7 became mandatory) ,  
on average the capitalized leased assets and capitalized lease liabilities represented 
about  three per cent  o f  c a p i t a l i z e s ’ total assets and five per cent o f  c a p i t a l i z e s ’ total 
liabilities respectively.  This prel iminary evidence suggests that finance lease 
accounting  policy was not a major  agenda  in terms o f  policy choices and its effect on 
the lessee f i rms’ profitabili ty and financial structure. This finding also leads to the 
inference that for the non-capitalizers,  their finance lease commitments  may even be 
less significant than those o f  the cap i ta l izes ,  and consequent ly adopted the footnote 
disclosure account ing policy based on the a rguments that it is an adequate form o f
21 This explanation suggests and re-affirms that a firm has a portfolio of accounting policies at 
its disposal (Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981).
V o l .  6. N o .  2 D e c  1998
©  Centre  for Indones ian  A c c o u n t in g  and M a n a g e m e n t  R esearch
1 4  L e a s e  A c c o u n t in g  in Australia: Further
report ing (Abdel-khalik,  1981; Lawrence and Bear, 1986; Murray,  1982, 
Narayanaswamy,  1994; Wilkins and Zimmer .  1983a and b).
S u m m a r y  a n d  Con clu s ion
The objective o f  this study is to examine  the economic factors motivat ing 
Austral ian listed lessee companies to adopt capitalization o f  footnote disclosure of  
their  f inance lease commitments  throughout  1985 to 1987 as permitted by the 
transit ional provision o f  the accounting standards AAS 17: Accounting for Leases. It 
is hypothesised that the decision to capitalize, rather than to disclose finance lease 
commitments  in the footnoted o f  the financial statements,  is posit ively related to a 
f i rm's  (1) corporate structure, (2) debt  contract financial constraints,  (3) size, (4) 
political visibility, (5) financial performance,  and (6) overseas association.
The result reveals that hypotheses H2, H4 and H6 are in the expected 
direction. Flowever, only H4 is statistically significant which suggests that the 
capitalization decision was positively related to lessee f i rm’s political visibility as 
measured  by the level o f  press coverage.  It can also be inferred that capitalization my 
be used by lessee firms as a means  o f  reducing wealth transfers related to the 
political process and also as a signal to the market  that they are better quality firms.
There  are perhaps other  plausible explanations for f irms'  capitalization o f  
leases dur ing the transitional period. For example,  firms that capitalized their finance 
leases, t imed their  adoption with a view to "earning management"  prior to the 
mandatory compliance data o f  AAS 17 (Ali and Kumar,  1993; Gujarathi  and Hoskin, 
1992; Pincus and Wasley,  1994).
A potential limitation o f  this study is that the practices relating to accounting 
t reatment  o f  finance leases in the year o f  issuance o f  AAS 17 and during the period 
o f  exposure  draft ED 17 were not examined and may confound the analysis o f  this 
study. Other  limitations are the very modest  explanatory power and the lack 
explanat ions for findings that are contrary to expectat ions.22
Even though only one o f  the research hypotheses was supported,  the findings 
have some implications.  First, the level o f  press coverage has been found to be a 
significant predictor  for f i rm 's  political visibility; an evidence that firms will respond
22 As noted by Bazley et al., (1985) that “the results here [as in the case of this study] have 
confirmed the difficulty we have in explaining discretionary accounting policy choice. This 
'relatively modest’ explanatory power...is not unique to this study” (p. 61). Other accounting 
policy studies which exhibit modest explanatory pow'er include the studies by Brown, lzan. 
and Loll (1992), Whittred and Chan (1992), and Wilkins and Mok (1991)
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efficiently to media coverage. From a signaling theory perspective,  the firm is 
signaling to the market  that it is adopting a more restrictive ( income reducing) 
account ing policy and thus indicating it is a better quality firm.
Second,  whilst the standard setters may believe that a lengthy transitional 
period is useful to the lessee firms and users o f  financial statements,  the evidence o f  
this study suggests otherwise.  This is because at the end of  1987 only about  21% o f  
the total sampled lessee lirms (67 out o f  314 firms) that had finance lease 
commitments  opted to capitalize early. Furthermore,  there is prim a facie  evidence 
that among the first-time cap i ta l izes ,  the level o f  average capital ized leased assets 
had reduced from 1985 to 1987. This suggests that lessee firms during the period not 
only re-negotiated the existing finance lease agreements but possibly re-negotiated 
with the lessors to make the existing finance lease commitments  appear  as an 
operat ing lease and thus not brought into account (Abdel-khalik,  1981; Godfrey  and 
Warren,  1995; Whittred and zimmer , 1992).r ’
The findings of  this study also suggests a lack o f  support for any proposal  to 
have a lengthy transit ional period in future account ing standards.  This is because 
dur ing this period, as in this case, the transitional period of  AAS 17, the financial 
s tatements o f  lessee firms were incomparable due to different f inance lease 
account ing policies adopted by the lessees. There are costs,  private and social,  
resulting from a resulting from a reduction in c ross-company (lessee) comparabi l i ty 
and thus complicates  "the cross-sectional adjustment  of  financial statements to a 
uniform basis” , (Langer  and Lev, 1993 p. 516).
One  area for future research is to test the hypothesis o f  income smooth ing  by 
the cap i ta l izes ,  this study could also be extended to include the industry effect as 
fable 2 reveals a significant relationship between firms'  industry membersh ip  and 
their f inance lease account ing policy choice. Another  area for future research is to 
extend the application o f  the joint  contracting/signaling f ramework in examining  the 
economic factors motivating lessee firms'  choice to either adopt ei ther adopt  early to 
defer  the adoption of  the requirement to capitalize their f inance lease within the 
transit ional period. Finally this study could be replicated in other countries especial ly 
in countries that developed their account ing standards based on IASC standard on 
lease accounting,  IAS 17: Account ing for Leases which also has a lengthy
This form of reaction bv the lessee is contrary to the spirit of the standard, which did not 
intend to encourage lessees to circumvent the provisions of AAS 17 but to allow lessees the 
opportunity "to gain experience in presenting...information relating to leases" (para. 34). 
Therefore, it is plausible to hypothesise that multi-year adoption period is a political rather 
than an economic arrangement (Langer and Lev, 1993) which gave firms the opportunitv to 
manipulate income (Pincus and Wasley, 1994).
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t ransitional period. The findings o f  such studies would enhance understanding on
cross-cultural  behaviours o f  managers in accounting policy choices (Hofstede,  1983
and 1984).
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T a b l e  1. Descriptions of  Variables
V ar ia b l e s Descr ip t ions
D e p e n d e n t  va r ia b l e s
A D O P T (0,1) finance lease accounting choice: footnote 
disclosure (0); capitalization (1).
I n d e p e n d e n t  va r ia b le s
O C M C  (1)
(0.1) owner-control led (OC)  if one party has more 
than 10% of  voting shares, and exercise active control,  
or if one party has more than 20% o f  voting shares 
(0); otherwise manager-controlled (MC)  (1).
DEBT Total liabilities divided by total tangible assets
S IZE ( l ) Total assets
PRESS Level o f  press coverage as cited in the Australian 
Business Index (ABI)
PE R F ( l ) Adoption year net income less prior year net income 
divided by prior year net income
OSEAS (0,1) no overseas association in terms o f  foreign 
parent relationship, or overseas listing status (O': 
otherwise (1).
Financial variables. DEBT. S1ZF 
and PERF. are adjusted
To remove the effect of capitalization of finance leases.
A l t e rn a t i v e  p ro xy Descr ip t ion
OCM C( 2) Percentage o f  ordinary shares held by other than the 
top 20 shareholders; widely held = MC firm; narrow ly 
held = OC firm.
S1ZE(2) Total revenue
SIZE(3) Net  income after tax before extraordinary items
PERF(2) (0,1) firms with negative change (i.e., decrease in 
profit or increase in loss) in net income tax before 
extraordinary items with positive change (i.e., increase 
in profit or decrease in loss) (1).
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Tabic 2
Sample  Companies  Grouped Under Major Industry Classification: 1985-1987
Industry Capital izer 
n ()/()
Non-Capital  izer 
n <)/()
Total 
n 0/0
Industrial and 
Commercial
3 5 52 183 74 218 69
Resources 21 31 47 19 68 77
Financial Institutions -l 4 7 6 7
Diversified
companies
9 14 13 5 77 7
Total 67 100 247 100 314 100
yj  = 12.850; d. f  = 3;/? = 0.005
Tabic 3.
Descriptive Statistics 1985-1987 (After Data Transformat ion)
(1) Capitalizes ( A r = 67) (2) Non-capitalizers (:Y = 274)
Expected
relation
Interval-
variable Mean Mediam SD Mean Median SD
d ) > ( 2 ) OCMC(2
)
24.122 21.010 13.443 27.565 26.700 14.698
(D>(2) LnDEBT 0.41 1 0.406 0.167 0.407 0.409 0.25 1
(1) >(2) LnSIZE(
1)
11.380 1 1.129 1.644 1 1.540 1 1.367 1.624
LnSIZE(
2)
10.751 10.972 2.166 11.110 1 1.207 2.244
SqSIZE(
3)
333.916 318.866 80.183 334.44
4
319.149 53.066
( 0 X 2 ) LnPRES
S
3.238 3.091 1.293 3.1 12 3.091 1.268
(D>(2) SqPERF(
1)
174.918 178.126 23.914 178.44
4
178.160 6.102
Ordinal-
Variable (0) (1) (0) (1)
OCMC( 1 
)
51 16 186 61
PERF(2)
**
7 7 34 60 184
OSEAS 62 5 222 25
** Due to missing values, some companies are excluded.
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T a b l e  4
Spearman Rank Correlation Matrix (with Probabilities in Parentheses): 1985-1987
Variable OCMC OCMC LnDFBT LnSIZF LnSIZE LqSIZF LnPRES SqPERF PERF OSEAS
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3) S (1) (2)
OC'MC 1.000
(1)
OCMC 0 510 1.000
(2) (0.000)
LnDFBT -0 069 
(0.1 10)
-0.085
(0.069)
1.000
1 n S I / l
(1)
0 0 7 5  
(0 091 )
0 131 
(0.011)
0.0323
(0.000)
1.000
I n S I / l 0 . 10(i 0.190 0.297 0.850 1.000
(2) (0 029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
I.qSI/1 (1 1 14 0.190 0.107 0.696 0.706 1.000
(3) (0 023) (0.001) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000)
InPRFS 0 0 7 7 0.190 0.213 0.670 0.515 0.459 1.000
S (0.086) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SqPERF 0.019 -0.026 0.093 0.070 0.042 0.263 0.079 1.000
(1) (0.372) (0.328) (0.054) (0.114) (0.233) (0.000) (0.087)
PERF 0.003 0.059 0.039 0.200 0.219 0.476 0.088 0.269 1.000
(2) (0.473) (0.156) (0.251) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000)
OSEAS -0.084 -0.149 -0.040 0.122 0.169 0.172 -0.064 0.003 0.079 1.000
(0.068) (0.005) (0.241) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.126) (0.478) (0.084)
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T ab le  5
Split Sample Validation of  Logistic Regression Estimation: 1985-1987
Independent
Variable
Expected
r e l a t i o n
"Best” model 
( \  314) 
Coefficient 
\\ aid stat.
Sub-1 
(n 155) 
Coefficient 
Wald stat.
Sub-2 
(n 159) 
Coefficient 
Wald stat.
Constant 0.1550 1.1529 -0.5545
0.0151 0.3431 0.1062
OCMC (2) -0.0194 -0.0193 -0.0105
2.75I4a 1.2750 0.3939
LnDEBT - -0.1316 -0.8542 1.5972
0.0499 0.6669 1.3998
LnSIZE(2) -0.1759 -0.2378 -0.1 884
1. 51 I 4 b 1.1036 0.9448
LnPRESS 0.4388 0.5267 0.3510
4.997 1 a 3.1075a 1.84051
SqPERF(I) -0.71 17 -1.1 899 -0.3937
4.63891 5.5020a 0.7405
OSEAS 0.0973 0.5350 0.0499
0.031 1 0.3415 0.0049
Model y~ 12.672 1 1.521 5.171
(/> -  0.0485) (p -  0.0735) (p 0.5221)
°0 correct!) classified 81.53°,. 82.27° o 80.82" „
a Significant at p  < 0.05
b. significant at /; < 0 . 10
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